and anticoagulation in view of the high susceptibility of paraplegics to pulmonary embolus.
The very intensive phase of his management was supervised by Mr J N Norman. There were five doctors in attendance continuously and in all fifteen specialists were involved on a consultative basis. The neurological lesion is still improving slowly and he is continuing to have intermittent hyperbaric oxygen therapy and will continue to do so until stabilization is reached. The long-term prognosis is impossible to give since this lesion is of a different nature from a traumatic section of the cord and remarkable degrees of recovery from paraplegia have occurred in the past when this has followed a diving accident. So far survival has not occurred from a quadriplegia resulting from an accident of this kind, the normal history being either immediate death at the time of the blow up or death a week or so after the recompression phase and due to the multitude of problems which arise in managing the residual complications. It is now five weeks since this patient's accident. He Richardson (1975) defines a disaster as 'an event when Emergency Services are required to implement a special organization to manage the situation'. This definition is flexible within the context of the situation and the environment where the disaster occurs, and is not constrained by an arbitrary figure of 'casualties' which may or may not be whisked to an intensive care unit within 30 minutes. I would therefore adopt this definition as -particularly relevant to the rig disaster, where there may be one or 20 casualties, rather than that suggested in a Health Board Planning document on the same subject: 'An accident where at least six stretcher cases will require to be evacuated to hospital depending on the severity of injuries or a set of circumstances which makes the implementation of the accident procedure necessary.' Of this latter definition only the alternative 'set of circumstances' is near satisfactory.
Disaster planning in this country is heavily weighted in favour of the accident. However, as pointed out by the British Medical Association Scottish Council (1975) , a problem could arise from an outbreak of acute infection in an oil rig populationfor example food poisoningresulting in the total prostration of 20-30 persons: surely as much a major disaster on an oil rig as in an airliner, if the pilot is among the sufferers.
I would suggest also that what is merely a highly unfortunate happening if it occurs two miles away from a district general hospital can well be construed as a disaster if it occurs on an oil rig 300 miles north of Aberdeen in a Force 10 (storm) windspeed of 48-55 knots. In such a situation disaster planning, however efficient, is virtually unable to give aid to a stricken rig (other than via a communication link) and the ability to undertake self-help is paramount.
Possible Disaster Situations
The events that could give rise to a disaster situation on an oil rig are:
(1) A blow out caused by uncontrolled violent escape of oil or gas from a well due to failure to maintain adequate fluid pressure against the oil bearing formation, geological faults, or abnormal unexpected high pressures.
(2) Fire or explosion, whether generated from within the rig itself or due to sabotage. For such an event to occur it is necessary to have a combustible material, air (or a supporter of combustion) and a source of ignitionor, of course, an explosive itself.
(3) Structural failure of the rig, such as occurred to Sea Gem in 1965 -due to fracture of the rig structurewith the loss of 13 lives, or to Transocean III in 1974 with no loss of life. Walker & Sibley (1976) have suggested that, like box-girder bridges, technology is being extended far-beyond the validity of simple design tests in the North Sea.
(4) Collision with the rig by ships, or by helicopter. Unlike a ship on a collision course the rig is incapable of avoiding action. The cranes and the drilling derrick in particular (Evans 1976) present a hazard to helicopters. (5) Terrorist attack with its obvious implications. (6) Diving operations, already discussed by Elliott (p 589) and Smith (p 593). (7) Occupational risks of the jobfrom machinery, from the physical working environment and from the weather. The seas around our shores are not the friendliest in the world, as many a sailorand oil manknows.
These possibilities may obviously occur as single entities or in combination. They may or may not give rise to casualties.
Morbidity and Mortality
In the Decade 1965-74 there have been 43 fatal accidents (including divers) and 175 serious injuries (Department of Energy 1975). In the last two years, 1973-4, the Department of Energy recorded 6 fatalities, and 22 serious injuries, to persons working on installations covered by the Mineral Workings (Off Shore Installations) Act. This is a fatal accident rate of 1.6 per thousand and a serious injury rate of 5.85 per thousand. In addition there were 36 serious occurrences not resulting in injury. In the first nine months of 1975 there were 4 deaths, 26 serious injuries and 35 serious occurrences not resulting in injury. (These 1974 and figures do not include deaths or accidents involving ships or divers.) The causes of death and type of injury sustained are given in Tables 1 and 2 . Houston (1973) who suggested that under normal circumstances work on a rig probably resulted in fewer accidents than a small factory on shore. The fatality rate demonstrated is approximately 50 times that of factory employees. These statistics show that to date the bulk of fatalities (excluding the Sea Gem disaster) and serious injuries, and indeed serious occurrences, have occurred in the normal work situation or in diving, not from blow outs, fire and explosion, collision or terrorist attack. This is not to say that it will remain so.
Disaster Plans
In discussing plans for a major rig disaster it is convenient to consider: (1) The action to be taken on the rig. (2) The action to be taken on shore.
(3) Transportation. (4) Communications.
Action to be taken on the rig: An oil rig can be likened to a ship at anchor without its own means of propulsion (Houston 1973) . Like a ship it must have its own contingency plan to deal with disaster for it may well be that hours might elapse before outside help, should this be required, can arrive. To keep to the ship analogy this requires that everyone on board knows exactly what to do in the event of a disaster and how to use the emergency equipment available. This plan must include: a man-overboard routine -4 fatalities in two years (Table 2) ; a 'medical' organization to cope with casualties; a communications system; and an abandon-rig procedure, should this be an unfortunate necessity, which must include provision for casualty evacuation. Whilst all these facets contribute to a successful plan, I will confine my remarks mainly to the medical aspects.
Should casualties arise on a rig in such a situation the prime responsibility for their initial treatment will rest with the rig 'Medic'. However, he may or will need assistance (or could conceivably have himself been killed or injured in the disaster). It is therefore not only important that he has sufficient training to deal with one or, more likely, a number of casualties but that an adequate 'first aid' party also exists.
To undertake such a task the right medical equipment and stores are required, so stowed that they cannot all be lost in the initial phase of a disasterunless this be catastrophic. Proctor (1976) has stated that: 'It would, of course, be ideal if there was an assurance that all rigs held large stocks of such material as burn dressings and infusion fluids to be used in the event of a major disaster.'
The qualifications required and/or the training needed by rig 'Medics' is not yet the subject of legislative provision. My own view is that the basic qualification should be that of an SRN together with extra training in the field of occupational medicine, diving medicine, major accident/casualty procedure, including some knowledge of intravenous fluid replacement, and the treatment of hypothermia and survivors.
Action to be taken on shore: In cns4eing the action on shore I hope I will be excused for covering the situation in one area, Aberdeen, in more detail than others.
Two parallel complementary medical organizations exist here, to cover the disaster situation. The first is the contact service between two major oil companies and a group of general practitioners in Aberdeen. Among the services provided is a 24 hour emergency service in event of accident and illness on offshore rigs and supervision of their first aid services. This has been described by Sheppard (1976) . The second is the Grampian Health Board Plan in event of a major rig disaster. It includes the provision of a surgical team of consultant or senior registrar, and registrar or senior house officer from the surgical side, and a registrar or senior house -officer in anesthetics, who can travel to the site of a rig disaster (Proctor 1976) .
Both organizations have their own air portable medical stores held at the heliport. Such stores include instrument packs, chest intubation packs, laparotomy packs, suture packs, cut-down sets, amputation packs, dressing and splints, drugs, resuscitation equipment, both cardiovascular and respiratory, and other miscellaneous items. The equipment for both services, although separate, is complementary.
A decision that faces either of these organizationsand the second is normally alerted by the first, which is the prime contact point for the rigis whether to proceed to the rig or to await the arrival of the casualty or casualties from the rig. This is a matter of considered professional judgment in which two factors are of paramount importance: (1) The accuracy of the information from the rig as to what has happened, what casualties have occurred, and what is the medical state of these casualties; as Sheppard (1976) has pointed out there is a world of difference between 'Man injured by hawser' and such a message qualified by 'Severe head injurypatient unconscious'. (2) The availability and whereabouts of transport to and from the rig; a rig with a helicopter on its helipad is in a different situation to one without.
Behind this front line of medical help to the rig is the other part of the disaster plan, the back up to be provided on shore commencing with the reception of casualties at the heliport. This follows a familiar pattern, based on control from the Aberdeen Royal Infirmary. The time scale between the rig disaster and the arrival of casualties on shore will be measured in hours, rather than minutes.
A similar two-pronged scheme exists in the Shetlandswith back up arrangements if necessary from Aberdeen due to the small number of doctors and beds available in these islands. For the southern North Sea fields the arrangements are of the same order.
Transportation: The helicopter is the usual method of transport for personnel between rig and shore. Maclean (1975) , Adamson (1975) and Evans (1976) detail somne of the problems involved in the use of helicopters, both as regards their general management and use, and those arising -from their use in an air ambulance role. Proctor (1976) neatly expresses one of the problems in this role by the query as to how alteration or modification can be made to adapt them for a 'Casevac' role without interfering with their normal commercial passenger-carrying role. He cites such problems as suction, intravenous infusion, monitoring and other aspects of treatment en route.
Should a large number of casualties occur on a rig, priorities will have to be established in evacuation to shore-side facilities. Proctor (1976) has pointed out that it will not be a question of packing the maximum number of casualties into each available helicopter. Some may need treatment en route, and space around the casualty will be essential. Various other considerations will also play a part, such as the urgency of evacuation, not necessarily a purely medical matter, the availability of other helicopters, pay load and distance to be travelled. Not least is the problem of the diver should transfer under pressure be the best decision. Thus triage will take place first on the rig, and it may be that the most serious cases will not be evacuated first. Resuscitation on the rig, in view of the travel distance, may be the overriding factor, if the objective of the triage, the minimization of death and disability, is to be achieved.
No disaster plan concerning offshore rigs should forget the possibility of helicopters being grounded by weather or possibly other means, or the helipad on the rig being out of action; in the latter case the winch is a possible answer, but the helicopter could not then refuel from the rigthus effectively cutting its range.
Communications: Several authors have drawn attention to the need for clear, unequivocal lines of communication in the oil rig situation (Sheppard 1976 , Proctor 1976 ). The methods normally used between rig and shore are radiotelephone or telex. This is but one part of the chain. Additionally ships, helicopters, and all shore-side organizationshospitals, police, ambulances, doctors, and many othersare involved in various communication links. As an example, the contract general practitioners have two-way radiotelephones when on call (Sheppard 1976) .
With the number of government departments and agencies involved, further chains of communication add a loadand probably some confusionto which I will return later.
From the doctor's viewpoint the communication net is valuable not only in that he can give advice to rig before arrival, but, given an accurate assessment of a casualty or casualties by the rig 'Medic', he can decide whether to proceed alone or with the surgical team, or ask for the injured to be brought ashore. As already mentioned, in extreme weather conditions the only contribution the doctor could make might be over this net.
A Real Disaster At this point it may help to look in outline at the Ekofisk accident on 1 November 1975. Here there was an explosion and resultant fire from a burst oil pipe beneath the sea. The fire was quickly extinguishedgood damage control, but meanwhile an 'abandon rig' occurred. It is not yet clear whether this was ordered. Most of the rig crew clambered into a support vessel fortuitously alongside. Seven men tried to escape, however, in the one undestroyed escape capsule. The release procedure went wrong, and the capsule fell 90 ft (30 m) into the sea. Three men died and 3 were seriously injured. The casualties were lifted from an adjacent rig by helicopter. Hospital admission occurred 2 hours 5 minutes after the injuries were sustaineda comparatively short interval in the context of possible rig disasters.
The Ekofisk accident might be compared with a theoretic situation on Rig 'X', because any disaster plan should assume that conditions are weighted against it (Table 4 ). (Murphy's first law is always applicable: 'If anything can go wrong, it will.') In such a situation Rig 'X' would be thrown back for some considerable time on its own resources, with no immediate prospect. of outside helpexcept any advice which could be obtained over the communications network. The need for the rig's own medical team to be able to provide adequate care, which would require both professional expertise and the equipment to undertake necessary treatment, would therefore be vital, as would be their ability to discuss or obtain advice over the communications network. The better trained the rig 'Medic' the easier it will be for him to undertake this task and to seek and obtain the correct advice.
We are all familiar with winter news broadcasts concerning the inability to relieve lightships or lighthouses, but an oil rig with a crew of 70 (against 2-5) working at a hazardous task where the possibility of an accide'nt is immeasurably greater could well present as my Rig 'X' situation, and cannot be lightly dismissed from any planning parameters.
Disaster Exercises
Exercises have been held to test various plans and events that have a place in the offshore tapestry. To date, as far as can be ascertained, none has been held to test the medical side of any plans. One in 1975 was mainly concerned with communications. Many of the lessons learnt concerned interdepartmental communication but the question of coordination of helicopter and/or sea evacuation from rigs was raised. It is suggested that this would best be undertaken by HM ships or maritime patrol aircraft. An exercise has also been held concerned with terrorist acts on North Sea rigs. Conclusion I have given a very sketchy outline of some of the ideas, plans and problems associated with possible major rig disasters. Planning continues on many fronts but the following facets, some of which are already under active consideration, are of particular medical interest:
(1) The logistics of medical supplies, their quantity, location and portability throughout the areas both on and off shore, associated with North Sea offshore operations.
(2) Centralization and rationalization of clear lines of communication between all involved, to include the possibility of closed circuit television suggested by Sheppard.
(3) The qualifications required by, and the training of, rig'Medics'. (4) The easy adaptation of the helicopter for the air ambulance/evacuation role. (5) Realistic exercises to test the medical plans for the disaster situation.
Role of the Armed Services: The Ministry of Defence (Navy and RAF) is responsible for the protection of all installations and for providing emergency evacuation and assistance in cases of major disaster. On the medical side, the Royal Naval Medical Service will continue to make available its considerable expertise in the relevant fields, particularly of diving medicine.
